IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE DOMESTIC
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR
RIGHTS

Michael J. Wishniet
Globalization poses many challenges to working people and their
advocates. The erosion of barriers to international trade and investment has
increased the mobility of goods and capital, but restrictions on the free
movement of workers have endured. As a result, there is a pressing need
for upward harmonization of labor rights across borders,' the further
definition of international labor standards and development of mechanisms
to enforce them,2 and crucially, support for international and cross-border
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1. See, e.g., Stephen Herzenberg, In from the Margins: Morality, Economics, and
InternationalLabor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
99-114 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) (presenting strategies for
upward harmonization of labor standards).
2. It has been widely noted that the International Labor Organization lacks any
meaningful enforcement procedures. See, e.g., Lance A. Compa, The FirstNAFTA Labor
Cases: A New InternationalLabor Rights Regime Takes Shape, 3 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 159, 160
It must rely on behind-the-scenes
(1995) ("[The ILO has no sanctioning power ....
dialogue, embarrassing publicity or other forms of moral force to persuade labor rights
violators to change their conduct."); Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade,
Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 63 (2001) (stating that
ILO has "no enforcement powers... [and] no sanctions other than 'jaw boning,' which
many violators regularly ignore"). The United States has also imposed unilateral labor
conditions on certain trade and investment regimes. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm
Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2001) (analyzing
the use of unilateral conditions in trade and investment statutes and concluding that
"economic sanctions have an importance beyond their classical role in seeking to punish and
alter a foreign state's behavior-that of assisting in the international definition,
promulgation, recognition, and domestic internalization of human rights norms.")'. These
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organizing initiatives.3 In light of the demands on the limited resources of
United States unions and other labor advocates, it may seem folly to
suggest an additional strategy for addressing the consequences of
globalization. Yet there is a further method of advocacy, one that is
relatively low-cost but could both advance the direct interests of some of
the most exploited workers in this country and aid broader international
labor rights initiatives: enforcement of international labor standards in the
United States, particularly on behalf of immigrant workers.
There are unfortunately numerous instances in which government
policies or private employer practices in the United States violate
international labor law.4 In this Article I outline two specific strategies that
labor advocates should consider incorporating into their existing efforts on
behalf of working people in the United States. The first is federal litigation
on behalf of immigrant workers for violations of international labor law,
pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") 5 The second is
challenging United States under-enforcement of existing labor rights and
standards by invocation of the international consultative and arbitration
processes established by the labor side-agreement to the North American
measures have been opposed by business interests, as well as criticized as unilateral and
interventionist by leading human rights scholars. See Philip Alston, Labor Rights
Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism"?,in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 71, 72 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds.,
1996). Initiatives to define and enforce international labor standards have also been
rightfully condemned as ineffectual. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRADING AWAY
RIGHTS:

THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE

OF NAFTA'S LABOR

SinE AGREEMENT

(2001)

[hereinafter TRADING AWAY RIGHTS] (criticizing labor side agreement); Cleveland, supra, at
3 ("[I]nternational mechanisms for [labor norm] enforcement remain underdeveloped.").
3. See, e.g., David Montgomery, Labor Rights and Human Rights: A Historical
Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS,

AND INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

13, 18-21

(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) (reviewing history of and emphasizing
need for international labor solidarity); Lance Compa, NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: A
Three-Year Accounting, 3 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 6, 21-22 (1997) (describing crossborder organizing initiatives before and after the adoption of NAFTA); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 93, 102 (1999) ("It is ironic, but perhaps not accidental, that as
union strength is declining at the national level, national unions are making more efforts
than ever to develop international ties and cross-border strategies.").
4. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS

(2001) (documenting violations in the United States of international guarantees of freedom
of association and right to organize); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN IN THE HOME: ABUSE
OF DOMESTIC WORKERS WITH SPECIAL VISAS IN THE UNITED STATES

(2001) [hereinafter

HIDDEN IN THE HOME] (documenting violations of international prohibitions on involuntary

servitude and forced labor in treatment of certain domestic workers employed by diplomats
and international officials in United States).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001) (establishing the right of action and federal jurisdiction
over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States").
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Free Trade Agreement ("NAFT'A"), known formally as the North
American Agreement for Labor Cooperation ("NAALC").6
Both strategies are worthy of consideration because they may further
the campaign-specific goals of individual workers, unions, and other labor
organizations, but also for the independent reason that each will compel
United States judicial and executive-branch institutions to measure public
and private domestic labor practices against international standards. Such a7
process can contribute to what has been termed "norm internalization."
Moreover, embracing either strategy may enable United States labor
advocates to "lead by example" in taking international labor standards
seriously and demanding that United States public and private institutions

honor our nation's international obligations. This, in turn, may offer a
potentially useful response to those who oppose further definition and
development of international labor norms and who criticize the movement
as concerned solely with protecting domestic labor markets in advanced
industrial nations."
Part I of this paper considers the potential for ATCA litigation to
further the interests of non-citizen workers in this country, while
simultaneously contributing to "norm internalization" by forcing federal
courts (and perhaps the Justice Department and the media as well) to
evaluate domestic practices against international standards. 9 Part II turns to
petitions under the NAALC. After summarizing the NAALC's dispute
resolution procedures, it analyzes two little-examined petitions that have
challenged an information-sharing agreement between the United States
Department of Labor ("DOL") and the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") and delays in claim adjudications by the
New York Workers' Compensation Board. This Part concludes by

6. North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
7. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 6 (defining norm internalization as "process by which
nations incorporate international law concepts into their domestic practice... through
repeated interactions between states and a variety of domestic and transnational actors,
which produce interpretations of applicable global norms and ultimately the internalization
of those norms into states' domestic values and processes"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey hternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (explaining how the
process of norm internalization is central to understanding why nations follow international
law). See also Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy, 22
BERKELEY J. ENMP. & LAB.L. 271, 286-91 (2001).
8. Stephen S. Golub, Are International Labor Standards Needed to Prevent Social
Dumping?, FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1997 (proposing that the establishment of international labor
standards may serve protectionist goals); Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The
Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkage for the
WTO's Future,24 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 608, 639 n.104 (2000) ("U.S. proposals can convey
more of a trade protectionist than an internationalist human rights concern.").
9. See infra notes 11-68 and accompanying text.

532

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4:3

considering additional uses of the NAALC petition process in furthering
domestic labor initiatives and encouraging the development of international
labor norms.'
I do not wish to overstate the potential utility of either ATCA
litigation or NAALC petitions directed at United States domestic labor
practices. Plainly there are substantial limitations on the immediate and
long-term objectives that can be achieved from each. Nevertheless, both
strategies could have important, concrete benefits for specific labor
campaigns in this country, and meaningfully contribute to more long-term
efforts to develop and enforce international labor standards.
I.

LABOR RIGHTS LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT

One overlooked vehicle for enforcing international labor rights
violations committed in the United States is the ATCA. The statute traces
its origins to the first Judiciary Act of 178911 and has enjoyed a latetwentieth century renaissance as the touchstone of transnational human
rights litigation brought in the United States. 12 To date, human rights
advocates have utilized the ATCA principally as a means to challenge
human rights violations committed abroad. Courts have recognized ATCA
claims for torture, genocide and war crimes, summary execution,
disappearance, arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment' 3 -- as well as for violations of international prohibitions on
forced labor and involuntary servitude. 14 In several recent cases, however,
10. See infra notes 69-149 and accompanying text.
11. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789). On the history of the provision, see
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statue: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221 (1996).
12. See generally BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996) (analyzing ATCA litigation); Sarah H. Cleveland,

Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1533, 1561 n.131
(1998) (summarizing recent ATCA cases).
13. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that victims from BosniaHerzegovina sufficiently alleged violations of international law and law of war for purposes
of the ATCA), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994) (granting jurisdiction under the ATCA in a suit against the former
Philippines president for torture, summary execution, and murder); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886
F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (establishing that expatriot citizens of Guatemala had a cause
of action against the former Minister of Defense under the ATCA for acts of brutality
committed by Guatemalan military forces); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(concerning a suit brought under the ATCA by Haitian citizens against a former military
ruler for torture and false imprisonment); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (establishing that the ATCA provided a cause of action for Argentine citizens
seeking damages against a former Argentine general for actions including torture, murder,
and prolonged arbitrary detention).
14. See In re: World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d
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workers have sought to use the ATCA to further domestic labor organizing
initiatives and15to redress individual labor violations committed within the
United States.
A.

The Scope of Labor Law Violations Enforceable UnderATCA
ATCA establishes a cause of action and federal jurisdiction over "any

civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.' 6 The statute was rarely used
before its revival by the Second Circuit in 1980 in a landmark human rights
case arising in Paraguay. 17 Since 1980, human rights lawyers and activists
have used the ATCA to press claims for violations of international law in

numerous cases brought by non-citizens suing in tort, typically involving
core human rights claims of torture, genocide, and war crimes."
1160, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that forced labor allegations by Chinese and Korean
workers state a claim under ATCA, but dismissing claims as time-barred); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445-46 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding the same, as to slave labor
claims brought under ATCA against German subsidiary of Ford Motor Co.); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding Burmese pipeline workers
alleging forced labor and slavery stated a claim under ATCA).
15. Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 0031, slip op. at 51-53 (D.N. Mar. I. Nov. 26,
2001) (involving ATCA allegations of involuntary servitude and violations of right to
associate and be free of discrimination by garment workers in Saipan); Manliguez v. Joseph,
No. 01 Civ. 7574 (E.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 13, 2001) (involving the same, by a former domestic
worker from the Philippines employed in private home); Hikabanze v. Shamapande, No. 00
Civ. 9712 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 22, 2000) (involving an ATCA allegation of involuntary
servitude by former domestic worker from Zambia employed in the private home of a
United Nations official); Okezie v. Udogwu, No. 99 Civ. 3345 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1999)
(concerning the same, by a former domestic worker from Nigeria employed in a private
home). See also Michael Cooper, Woman in Child Servitude Case Faced a Neglect
Complaint in 1988, N.Y. TaIES, July 16, 1999, at BI (describing ATCA allegations of
involuntary servitude in Okezie litigation). I have served as co-counsel for the workers in
Hikabanze, Okezie, and Manliguez, supra, as well as those in United States v. PaolettiLemus, infra note 52, Montero v. INS infra note 146, "Mina Das" and Gurbachan Juneja,
infra note 60, and the petitioners in Mexico NAO 98-04 and Mexico NAO 01-01, infra
notes 95-132 & accompanying text.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001).
17. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the ATCA
provides federal jurisdiction in a claim against a Paraguayan official by the estate of a
torture and murder victim). The D.C. Circuit subsequently adopted a somewhat narrower
view of the statute. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(dismissing an action brought under the ATCA by survivors of persons murdered in an
attack on a civilian bus in Israel). However, Congress confirned the Second Circuit's
approach by enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232 (concerning genocide, rape, torture in former
Yugoslavia); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 162 (involving torture in Guatemala); Paul, 812 F.
Supp. at 207 (involving torture in Haiti); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving murder, torture, rape, and terrorism in Zimbabwe); Estate of
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Nearly all modem ATCA litigation has challenged conduct committed
outside the United States, but nothing in the text, history, or purpose of the
statute imposes any such limitation, and the only court yet to issue an
opinion on the viability of an ATCA claim arising in the United States held
that nothing in the statute restricts its application to human rights violations
committed extraterritorially.' 9 In fact, litigation of torts committed in the
United States would avoid two of the common objections often raised to
ATCA claims
arising abroad, namely the doctrine of forum non
• 20
conveniens and the requirement of establishing personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. 2 ' Neither difficulty is likely to arise in litigation concerning
torts committed in the United States.
One issue that may arise in ATCA challenges to labor abuses concerns
the applicability of international law to private employers. Although much
of international law is directed at the regulation of states, the dearth of
ATCA challenges to international law violations by private parties is no
barrier to such claims. In fact, some international law norms regulate
private as well as public behavior. Decisions authored by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C.
Circuit, as well as by various district courts, have recognized that litigants
may use ATCA to enforce those international norms which apply to private
actors.22 The Second Circuit has expressly rejected the view that "the law
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D.Fla. 2001) (involving extrajudicial
killing, torture, crimes against humanity in Chile); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11 th
Cir. 1996) (involving torture in Ethiopia).
19. See Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998) (refusing to dismiss ATCA
claims by INS detainees against government officials and contractors). In Doe v. The Gap,
the court dismissed the ATCA claims on behalf of Saipan garment workers for failing to
allege sufficient facts, without commenting on the propriety of an ATCA claim arising in
the United States. Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 0031, slip op. at 51-53 (D. N. Mar. I.
Nov. 26, 2001).
20. See Cleveland, supra note 12, at 1576 (noting that defendants in ATCA litigation
arising abroad may invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but concluding that
doctrine is "surmountable"). Cf.Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(dismissing ATCA claim on forum non conveniens grounds).
21. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 1575 (noting personal jurisdiction rules can create
"procedural hurdles" to ATCA litigants).
22. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing
dismissal of ATCA claims for torture, imprisonment and killings, allegedly performed by
Nigerian authorities at the instigation of private oil companies); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that individuals may be liable for piracy and
slave-trading under ATCA); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, Civ. No. 98-1986, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12711, at *17 n.5 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2000) ("[T]he Court will accept the Second Circuit's
conclusion that ATCA jurisdiction extends to private parties for egregious acts of
misconduct."); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that
non-state actors may be liable for slavery and forced labor under ATCA, but granting
summary judgment for defendants on facts of the case); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
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of nations, as understood in the modem era, confines its reach to state
action."' 3 Instead, the court held that "certain forms of conduct violate the
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a
state or only as private individuals. 24 Scholarly commentary endorses the
view that "international prohibitions of slavery, servitude, and forced labor
apply to state actors and private entities alike." 25
The international law definitions of slavery, servitude, and forced
labor are capacious enough to protect some workers in the United States
from contemporary forms of exploitation. 26 "Slavery" is the practice of
holding human beings as chattel, denying their legal personhood. 27 The
prohibitions on "servitude" or "slave-like practices" extend further to bar
debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, and the sale of children into labor,
terms that do not require evidence of involuntariness on the part of the
worker. 28 "Forced labor" refers to "all work or service which is exacted
Supp. 2d 424, 445-46 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that non-state actor may be liable for a forced
labor claim under ATCA but dismissing on other grounds); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.
Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss and holding that non-state
actors may be liable for slavery and forced labor under ATCA).
23. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
24. Id. (listing prohibitions on piracy, slave trade, and certain war crimes as examples
of international law regulation of private conduct); id. at 243 (noting that individuals may
also be liable for torture or summary execution when done in the course of genocide or as
war crime).
25. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 1564-69 (stating that the language of ATCA "does not
limit defendants to natural persons or state officials, and courts have heard claims against
private individuals, corporations, and associations"); Douglas S. Morrin, People Before
Profits: Pursuing CorporateAccountability for Labor Rights Violations Abroad Through
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 427 (2000) (describing how the
ACTA has become a way to promote corporate accountability abroad); A. Yasmine Rassam,
Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition of Slavery and the
Slave Trade Under Customary InternationalLaw, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 303 (1999) (tracing the
development of customary international law prohibition on slavery and the slave-trade).
26. See generally HIDDEN INTHE HOME, supra note 4, at 50-51 (reviewing international
law definitions of and instruments regarding slavery, servitude, and forced labor);
Cleveland, supra note 12, at 1569-70 (parsing terms).
27. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, art. 1(1), 46
Stat. 2183, 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 263 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery Convention] (defining
"slavery" as "the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised").
28. See Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter 1957 Supplementary Convention].
Debt bondage [is] ...the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor
of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a
debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards
the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not
respectively limited and defined.
Id. at art. 1(a), 18 U.S.T. at 3204, 266 U.N.T.S. at 41.
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from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said
person has not offered himself voluntarily. '29 Slavery, servitude, and
forced labor are now banned by numerous international instruments, 30 and
public and private violations of the prohibitions are fully enforceable under
ATCA, as the courts to consider the question have uniformly held.3'
United States domestic law also prohibits slavery, servitude, and
forced labor, as well as peonage and debt bondage.32 The judiciary has
been reluctant to recognize a private right of action to enforce these
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against non-governmental
defendants, however.33 In addition, in United States v. Kozminski, 4 the
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the statutory term "involuntary
Serfdom [is] the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or
agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to
render some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or
not, and is not free to change his status.
Id. at art. 1(b), 18 U.S.T. at 3204-05,266 U.N.T.S. at 41.
29. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S.
55, 58 (entered into force May 1, 1932) [hereinafter ILO Forced Labor Convention].
30. In addition to the 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 27, the 1957 Supplementary
Convention, supra note 28, and the ILO Forced Labour Convention, supra note 29, these
include the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, June 18, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 1238 (1998); the African Charter of Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981,
art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59, 60 (1981); the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 6, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 146, 9 I.L.M. 99, 103; the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175, 6 I.L.M. 368, 371; the
European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, art. 1, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, 94; the Convention
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291; the
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271; and the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 4, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, 224-27.
31. Supra notes 22-24.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2001)
(prohibiting peonage); 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2001) (prohibiting involuntary servitude); 18
U.S.C. § 1589 (2001) (prohibiting forced labor); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2001) (providing for a
civil prohibition of peonage). For a recent analysis of the development of peonage laws in
this country, see Aziz Z. Huq, Note, Peonage and ContractualLiberty, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
351 (2001).
33. See, e.g., Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 0031, slip op. at 41-43 (D. N. Mar. I.
Nov. 26, 2001); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 373-74 (D.R.I. 1978)
(declining to recognize right of action against private defendant under the Thirteenth
Amendment), affd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979). But see City of Memphis v. Greene, 451
U.S. 100, 124 (1981) (recognizing private right of action against government defendants
under Thirteenth Amendment); Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523,
1534 (11 th Cir. 1986) (recognizing private right of action against private defendant under
Thirteenth Amendment).
34. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).

2002]

IMMIGRANT WORKERS

servitude" as requiring not only proof of psychological coercion, but also
proof of physical or legal coercion. 5 The Court's interpretation is
inconsistent with international law.36 It has also drawn the critical attention
of Congress, which in 2000 rejected the Kozminski analysis,37 enacted a
new criminal prohibition on "forced labor" short of the Kozminski Court's
narrow interpretation of involuntary servitude,3 ' and incorporated a more
expansive definition of "involuntary servitude" into new anti-trafficking
and immigration provisions.
Nevertheless, even in applying a restrictive construction of the
statutory term "involuntary servitude," courts have agreed on several
principles that confirm the possible utility of ATCA claims for a substantial
number of immigrant workers in this country. First, courts have
emphasized that "physical restraint" is not a required element of a claim for
involuntary servitude, because compulsion can be demonstrated by
establishing the actual or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.40
Second, even before Congress criminalized "forced labor" and embraced a
more expansive definition of "involuntary servitude" in anti-trafficking
laws,41 Justice O'Connor wrote for the Supreme Court that "it is possible
that threatening... an immigrant with deportation could constitute the

35. Id. at 949-52.
36. Joey Asher, Comment, How the United States is Violating Its International
Agreements to Combat Slavery, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 215, 219-20 (1994) (arguing that
United States courts have construed involuntary servitude statutes overly narrowly, in
violation of United States obligations under international law).
37. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(13), 114 Stat.
1466 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(13) (2001)).
38. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat.
1486-87 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2001)).
39. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(6), (13), 114
Stat. 1466-67 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(6), (13) (2001)) (recognizing in
legislative findings that "psychological abuse" and "nonviolent coercion" can constitute
involuntary servitude); Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 103(2),
(5), 114 Stat. 1469 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7102(2), (5) (2001)) (defining "coercion"
and "involuntary servitude" for trafficking provisions).
40. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 947; United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1000 (1st Cir.
1995) ("The government need not prove physical restraint" in involuntary servitude
prosecution); United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1278-81 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirning
conviction of cult leaders despite lack of physical barriers); United States v. Warren, 772
F.2d 827, 834 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding that in migrant labor camp, "[t]hat the worker had
the opportunity to escape is of no moment, if the [employer] has placed him in such fear of
physical harm that he is afraid to leave"); United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1977) (holding that placing a person "in such fear of physical harm that the victim is
afraid to leave, regardless of the victim's opportunities for escape," supports a finding of
involuntary servitude).
41. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(13) (2001)).
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threat of legal coercion that induces involuntary servitude. ''42 Accordingly,
even if United States courts were to apply the more restrictive criminal-law
definition of "involuntary servitude, ' 43 they would properly conclude that
non-citizens forced to labor under the threat of deportation might state an
ATCA claim for a violation of international law prohibitions on
involuntary servitude.
B.

Illustrative Uses of the ATCA

By the terms of the statute, ATCA will be directly useful only to noncitizen workers. Nevertheless, workers and their advocates could make
fuller use of ATCA to advance domestic labor struggles. There may be as
many as eleven million undocumented immigrants in the United States
today, 44 many of whom work long hours for low pay in dangerous
conditions. There are millions more legal immigrant workers.45 All of
these workers are capable of bringing claims under ATCA. Moreover, any
strategy that improves the circumstances of low-wage immigrant workers is
likely to have a positive effect on the terms and conditions of employment
of both their immediate colleagues and other workers.
There has been some ATCA litigation presenting claims of forced
labor and involuntary servitude committed outside the United States.4 6 A
42. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 948. See also Humphries v. Various Federal USINS
Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 946 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) dismissal of
involuntary servitude claim by pro se litigant, alleging the INS and FBI coerced him "on
several occasions with threats of deportation if he did not continue to work for them.");
Alzanki, 54 F.3d at 1004-05 (finding employer threats of deportation among evidence
supporting a conviction for holding domestic employee in involuntary servitude); Kimes v.
United States, 939 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming conviction for involuntary
servitude in part based on evidence of threats of deportation).
43. But see Asher, supra note 36, at 219-20; Cleveland, supra note 12, at 1578-79.
44. Cindy Rodriguez, Census Bolsters Theory Illegal Immigrants Undercounted,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 2001, at A4 (reporting that government and academic estimates of
the undocumented population range from six to eleven million persons).
45. INS estimates that there are more than ten million legal permanent residents in the
United States, as well as thousands of non-immigrants present on temporary visas for
purposes such as travel, business, study, and employment.
See Immigration and
Naturalization Service, State Population Estimates: Legal Permanent Residents and Aliens
Eligible to Apply for Naturalization, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/
aboutins/statistics/lprest.htm (last visited July 17, 2001).
46. See cases cited supra note 14. See also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1308-09 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (approving ATCA claim for violation of international law
prohibitions on forced labor and involuntary servitude by Burmese workers against pipeline
operator and government authorities, but granting summary judgment for defendant on facts
of case); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, Inc., No. 35-18 (S.D. Fla.) (complaint filed July 20,
2001) (stating ATCA claims on behalf of Colombian trade unionists alleging murder,
torture, kidnapping, unlawful detention, and violations of right to associate and organize, all
committed in Columbia).
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small number of cases have also alleged ATCA claims for international
labor violations committed within the United States. Of the latter, several
have been involuntary servitude claims asserted by immigrant domestic
workers employed in the United States and forced to work for little or no
pay under threat of deportation or physical violence.47 Another,
still
4s
pending, involves claims by garment workers employed in Saipan.
Together, these domestic cases raise the possibility that more

immigrant workers may press claims for violations of international labor
law, including claims of forced labor 4 9 committed in this country, ° by
private actors. 1 In light of the extreme coercion to which many
undocumented workers are subjected, including employer threats to contact
INS or, in some cases, physical restraint of workers 5 2 ATCA litigation of
labor violations may afford non-citizen workers broader remedies than
those otherwise available under domestic labor and employment statutes.
Prospects for ATCA litigation are even more apparent when one
considers the growth of organizing initiatives in immigrant communities
and workplaces in the last decade. Many of these initiatives have been led
by grassroots worker centers that arose in communities long overlooked by
the organized labor movement and government enforcement agencies,53
47. See, e.g., Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01 Civ. 7574 (E.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 13, 2001);
Hikabanze v. Shamapande, No. 00 Civ. 9712 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 22, 2000); Okezie v.
Udogwu, No. 99 Civ. 3345 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1999).
48. Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0031, slip op. at 51-53 (D. N. Mar. I. Nov. 26,
2001) (dismissing ATCA claims in class action litigation by garment workers in Saipan for
failure to allege facts sufficient to establish involuntary servitude and on grounds that
violations of right to associate and to be free of discrimination are not actionable under
ATCA).
49. See In re: Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F.Supp. 2d at 1179; Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 891-92; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
50. See Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358-60 (D.N.J. 1998) (describing abuse of
INS detainees).
51. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,239 (2d Cir. 1995); Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp.
2d at 1308-09.
52. See, e.g., Laura Ho, Catherine Powell & Leti Volpp, (Dis)assembling Rights of
Women Workers Along the GlobalAssembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 383, 383-84 (1996) (describing Thai garment workers confined
in an apartment complex in El Monte, California); Indictment, United States v. PaolettiLemus, et al., No. 97 Crim. 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing a conspiracy to hold deaf
Mexican peddlers in involuntary servitude in New York and Chicago); Complaint, Okezie,
No. 99 Civ. 3345 (describing a Nigerian woman held in involuntary servitude as a domestic
worker in Bronx, New York).
53. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road By Walking: Immigrant Workers, the
Workplace Project, and the Strugglefor Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407,
428-50 (1995) (discussing worker center movement and experience of The Workplace
Project in Hempstead, New York); Bob Port, Smuggling Debts Bring Servitude: Immigrants
Work 100 Hours a Week to Pay Loanshark, N.Y. DAILY NmVs, July 9, 2001, at 4
(describing activities of Chinese Staff & Worker Association in New York); Robin Haas,
Uniting on the Domestic Front, NEvSDAY, Dec. 18, 2000, at A27 (describing efforts of
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although the AFL-CIO has also demonstrated a growing activism in lowwage immigrant workforces 4 Because these campaigns frequently
involve litigation by individual workers, and because many of the workers
are non-citizens, depending on the facts in the individual cases, ATCA
claims may be included in lawsuits already planned in the service of larger
organizing goals.
One area in which ATCA litigation may be able to make a special
contribution is campaigns on behalf of domestic workers. There may be
more than one million domestic workers in the United States today.s
Domestic workers frequently work alone and are statutorily excluded from
the National Labor Relations Act.56 Thus, efforts to organize this
workforce by the mainstream labor movement have been negligible.5 7 Yet
their vulnerability has exposed these workers to some of the most extreme
forms of labor exploitation in the United States today, 58 and has prompted
independent domestic worker organizing efforts.5 ' To a large extent,
Workers' Awaaz in Jackson Heights, Queens to organize South Asian domestic workers);
Adam Geller, No Longer Silent: Domestic Workers Tell of Exploitation, THE REC. OF N.
N.J., May 28, 2000, at Al (discussing work of Andolan, a South Asian worker center in
New York); Joyce Wadler, An Unlikely Organizeras CabdriversUnite, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1999, at B2 (describing the work of New York Taxi Workers' Alliance).
54. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Statement of the Executive Council (February 16, 2000),
available at http:l/www.aflcio.orglpubllestatements/feb2000/immigr.htm (calling for a
repeal of employer sanction provisions of immigration laws, enactment of "whistleblower"
protections for immigrants who report labor violations, and legalization of undocumented
workers), Sharryn Kasmir, Review: Organizingto Win: New Research on Union Strategies,
27 WORK & OCCUPATIONS J. 1 (2000) (book review) (discussing UNITE Garment Worker
Centers, which have offered legal assistance to immigrant workers while promoting
organizing goals).
55. The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, estimates that in 1998
there were approximately 928,000 private household workers in the United States. See
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2000-01 ed.), available at http:l/www.bls.gov/
oco/ocosl75.htm.
In light of the prevalence of cash-only, off-the-books domestic
employment, this figure likely understates the actual number of household workers.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001) (stating that, for the purposes of the NLRA, "[tihe term
'employee' .. . shall not include any individual employed.., in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home").
57. See Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household
Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REv. 45, 52-71 (2000)
(analyzing history of efforts to organize domestic workers). Domestic workers are mostly
women of color, including large numbers of immigrants, and for these further reasons their
workforce has been long overlooked by the predominantly white and male organized labor
movement. Id. at 71.
58. See, e.g., HIDDEN INTHE HOME, supra note 4, at 7-12 (describing cases of domestic
workers exploited by diplomats and international officials).
59. See, e.g., Katia Hetter, Land of the Free, But No Holidays Off, NEWSDAY, July 4,
2001, at A32 (discussing the Domestic Workers United project of the Committee Against
Anti-Asian Violence in New York); Douglas Pasternak, Slavery in the Capitol's Shadow,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 2000, at 37-38 (discussing the work of CASA of
Maryland in advocating for domestic workers exploited by international officials); Cristina
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contemporary domestic worker organizing initiatives have centered on
campaigns of public education and protest linked to individual litigation
brought by domestic workers, typically against their former employers. 0
These initiatives have sought to achieve justice for individual workers,
educate others about their rights, and deter future misconduct by

employers.
One frustration has been the failure of the law to adequately recognize
the harm experienced by these workers, mostly women and immigrant,
often non-English speaking, and frequently isolated in private homes from
any social or family support. Enforcing minimum wage and overtime laws

cannot fully redress these workers' injuries. Pressing an ATCA claim for
forced labor or involuntary servitude can fill out the narrative of why so
many domestic workers remain in their employers' homes even after they
learn of their legal rights. This can also lead to fuller compensation for
exploited workers, and spur organizing and public education campaigns.
In addition, the pursuit of a civil claim for involuntary servitude may
inspire local prosecutors to consider bringing criminal charges, which
could in turn result in a restitution judgment in favor of the workers without
the need for a full civil trial, 61 and the regularization of the workers'
immigration status as a key witness in the criminal prosecution. 62 The

Riegos, Domestic Workers Organize, NAT'L NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RTS.
NEwSL., Fall 1997 (relating the efforts of the Domestic Workers' Association in Los
Angeles, California); Jessica Shattuck, Nahar Alam: Fightingfor the Rights of Domestic
Workers, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 1998, at 22 (describing efforts of Workers' Awaaz to
organize South Asian domestic workers in New York).
60. Chisun Lee, Trouble on the Home Front: 24 Hour Domestic Sues Upper East Side
Bosses, THE VILLAGE VOICE, July 17, 2001, at 21, (organizing around unpaid wage suit
brought by "Mina Das"); Steven Kreytak, Ex-Employee Sues Doctors Housekeeper,
NEwSDAY, Aug. 9, 2000, at A28; Tom Robbins, Protecting Exploited Domestics, N.Y.
DAILY NEws, Aug. 9, 1999, at 15 (concerning the same, around a suit by Gurbachan Juneja).
61. In 1996, Congress substantially revised the federal restitution statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§
3663-3664 (2001). These statutes now provide that restitution is a mandatory element of
many criminal sentences, including any sentence for a "crime of violence," 18 U.S.C. §
3663A(a) (1),(c), in the full amount of the victim's loss, § 3664(f)(1)(A), and that restitution
awards are privately enforceable by victims in the same manner as any other court
judgment. § 3664(m)(1)(B). Violations of the involuntary servitude statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1584 (2001), are "crimes of violence" making an award of restitution mandatory.
62. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (2001) (establishing S-visas for a victim or witness
who shares critical, reliable information with state or federal criminal law enforcement
authorities); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(t)(1) (2001). A person may remain in S-visa status for up to
three years, at which time she may apply to adjust her status to that of a legal permanent
resident. 8 U.S.C. § 12550)(1) (2001); 8 C.F.R. § 245.11 (2001). An S-visa holder is
eligible for work authorization, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(21) (2001), and immediate family
members may also be granted derivative S-visas. Id. at § 214.2(t)(3). See also 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(T) (2001) (establishing visa category for victims of trafficking); 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (a)(15)(U) (2001) (establishing visa category for victims of listed criminal activity who
suffered "substantial physical or mental abuse" and cooperated with law enforcement).

542

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4:3

twinning of civil damage actions with criminal prosecutions for involuntary
servitude violations has, in some recent instances, yielded restitution
judgments obviating a need for full-blown civil litigation by workers, as
well as the regularization of their immigration status.63 Ethics rules
prohibit attorneys from presenting, participating in the presentation of, or
threatening to present criminal charges solely for the purpose of obtaining
an advantage in a civil matter. 64 Merely reporting criminal activity to
authorities while a civil proceeding is pending does not, however,
necessarily violate such rules.65
A second area in which the litigation of ATCA claims may further
domestic labor initiatives is migrant farm worker advocacy, another heavily
immigrant workforce that is notoriously subject to abusive employment
practices. Of the few criminal prosecutions for violations of federal
peonage and involuntary servitude statutes, many have involved the
mistreatment of migrant agricultural workers.66 Like domestic workers,
agricultural workers are excluded from important labor statutes, 67 and the
litigation of wage-and-hour and contract claims for individual workers has

63. The first group of immigrant workers to receive S-visas based on their participation
in criminal prosecutions of their employer were a group of Thai garment workers in El
Monte, California. In 1997-98, the ringleaders of a gang that had forced deaf Mexican
workers to sell trinkets in the subways, airports, and other public spaces of New York and
Chicago were criminally prosecuted for holding the workers in involuntary servitude. The
workers were all offered "S" visas for themselves and their immediate family members. See
Mirta Ojito, U.S. Permits DeafMexicans, Forced to Peddle, to Remain, N.Y. TIMEs, June
20, 1998, at Al. The workers were also the beneficiaries of court-ordered restitution in the
criminal cases involving the ringleaders, thereby obviating the need for a private civil
damages action. See Joseph Fried, 2 Sentenced in Mexican Peddling Ring, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 1998, at B3 (noting that two defendants ordered to pay $1.5 million in restitution).
Finally, in United States v. Udogwu, No. 00-1724, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19250 (2d Cir.
Aug. 22, 2001), a couple was convicted of holding their domestic worker, a young Nigerian
woman, in involuntary servitude and ordered to pay a quarter-million dollars in restitution,
and the worker's status was regularized by INS. Interview with Christopher Meade, lead
counsel for worker, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (Feb. 2002).
64. See, e.g., Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 22 N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REG. § 1200.36 (DR 7-105) (2001) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall not
present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an
advantage in a civil matter").
65. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Assn. B. Comm. on Prof 1 and Judicial Eth., Formal Op. 1995-13,
1995 WL 877125, at *1 (pointing out that "DR 7-105(A) of tit. 22 § 1200.36 does not forbid
a lawyer who is seeking civil remedies on a client's behalf against a person who has also
violated a criminal statute from reporting the crime to the appropriate authorities").
66. Statement of Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, announcing the
formation of Worker Exploitation Taskforce (Apr. 23, 1998) ("Most of the cases [of
involuntary servitude] seem to involve undocumented workers... But there are also cases
involving migrant workers, which do involve United States citizens."), available at
http:llwww.usdoj.gov/archive/aglspeeches/1998/apr2398.htm.
67. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001) (excluding agricultural workers from NLRA).
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developed as one significant organizing strategy." To the extent that
migrant farm workers and their advocates, like some domestic worker
advocates, have already concluded that litigation of individual claims is a
useful organizing strategy, the inclusion of civil ATCA claims for
involuntary servitude, peonage, or forced labor, where appropriate, may
also lead to fuller legal remedies, expanded opportunities to convey a more
complete narrative of the workers' experience, and new organizing and
public education opportunities. In addition, inclusion of ATCA claims
where warranted may encourage more criminal prosecutions of involuntary
servitude violations, leading to both restitution awards and lawful
immigration status for the workers.
1I.

THE

NAALC PETITION PROCESS

Labor advocates in the United States could also make greater use of
the complaint procedures authorized by the North American Agreement for
Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), even recognizing the severe limitations of
the NAALC enforcement mechanism. In this Part, I sketch out the
NAALC procedures, relate two little-examined instances of their useful
invocation by advocates challenging labor conditions in this country, and
suggest future opportunities for their deployment on behalf of working
people in the United States.
A.

The NAALC and Its Procedures

The NAALC 69 is designed to promote labor rights and improve
working conditions by encouraging effective labor law enforcement in the
The NAALC establishes eleven "labor
three signatory nations.70
principles" and obligates each signatory nation to promote these
principles. 7' In addition, the NAALC commits each nation to a range of
68. Thomas Collins, Dole Sued Over Pay for Pickers, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 19,
2000, at lB (detailing class action against Dole Citrus, Inc. by 500 workers); Andy Furillo,
With Union in Decline, CaliforniaFarm Workers Turn Elsewhere, SACRAMENTO BEE, May
22, 2001 (discussing the shift towards legal advocacy as an organizing strategy for
California's migrant farm workers).
69. NAALC, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
70. NAALC, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1503 (objectives include "improv[ing] working
conditions and living standards," "promot[ing], to the maximum extent possible, the labor
principles set out in Annex 1," and "promot[ing] compliance with, and effective
enforcement by each Party of, its labor law").
71. NAALC, annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515-16 (identifying the eleven principles as:
freedom of association and right to organize; right to bargain collectively; right to strike;
prohibition of forced labor; child labor protections; establishment of minimum employment
standards, including minimum wage and overtime pay; elimination of employment
discrimination; equal pay for equal work; prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
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procedural guarantees in the enforcement of their domestic labor laws, such
as due process, transparency of adjudications, and publication of rules and
regulations.7
The NAALC, emphatically, does not require any nation
affirmatively to reform its labor laws.73
The NAALC creates a complaint procedure pursuant to which
individual workers or labor organizations may challenge one nation's
failure to enforce its domestic labor laws relating to any of the eleven
NAALC labor principles.74 Under the agreement, the United States,
Canada, and Mexico have each established a National Administrative
Office ("NAO") within its federal labor department to receive complaints,
known formally as "public communications," alleging violations of the
labor principles and the NAALC provisions concerning government
enforcement procedures.7 5
The agreement creates a three-tiered complaint process. An NAO
reviewing a petition related to any of the eleven labor principles must
report on the case and may recommend ministerial consultations.76 The
subsequent ministerial consultations have generally resulted in programs of
research, workshops, and public education,77 and to date none of the
"public communications" filed with the Canadian, Mexican, and United
States NAOs has advanced beyond the ministerial consultation stage.78
When a complaint is not resolved through ministerial consultation and
upon request of a consulting party, the NAALC authorizes the
establishment of an Evaluation Committee of Experts ("ECE") to assess the
effectiveness of a nation's labor law enforcement as challenged in a
petition.79 The ECE is to be constituted of outside experts, not government
officials, and is charged with issuing a report and recommendations.80 Of
the NAALC's eleven labor principles, alleged violations of eight of them
are subject to review by an ECE. Complaints charging violations of the
right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike are not subject to ECE

worker compensation; and migrant worker protection).
72. NAALC, arts. 5-7, 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
73. NAALC, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1503 ("Affirming full respect for each Party's
constitution and recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor
standards .... ").
74. See generally Compa, supranote 3, at 7-12 (concerning the same); Clyde Summers,
NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement and International Labor Standards, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 173, 174-80 (1999) (summarizing NAALC procedures).
75. NAALC, arts. 15, 16(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
76. NAALC, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
77. TRADING AWAY RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 24-32 (reviewing NAO submissions to

date).
78. Id. at 32.
79. NAALC, art. 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
80. NAALC, arts. 23-26, 32 I.L.M. at 1508-09.
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review.81 No ECE has yet been convened.
Finally, complaints involving three of the eleven labor principles
(enforcement of minimum wage, prohibition of child labor, and prevention
of occupational injuries), if not resolved at the ECE level, may proceed to a
five-member arbitration panel of outside experts.82 Such a panel is
empowered to issue an action plan for improving enforcement in the
relevant areas. 83 Non-compliance with the action plan may subject a
signatory nation to fines or loss of NAFTA tariff preferences for the
company or sector involved in the complaint.84 No complaint has reached
an arbitration panel, much less resulted in non-compliance proceedings that
could result in fines or a loss of tariff benefits.
B.

Domestic Uses of the NAALC: Two Illustrationsfrom Pending Cases

During negotiations over NAFTA, proponents of a labor sideagreement argued that the trade agreement would undermine domestic
labor conditions in part because Mexico did not enforce its existing labor
and employment laws." Supporters of the trade agreement presented the6
NAALC as responsive to the concern about Mexican under-enforcement,1
and it was widely assumed that the majority of NAALC petitions would be
filed in the United States and Canada alleging violations in Mexico.87
Consistent with these expectations, as of March 2002, advocates have filed
twenty-four different petitions under the NAALC, of which fifteen have
challenged Mexican under-enforcement of labor standards, seven have
alleged violations in the United States, and two have been brought against
Canada.8 '
81. The NAALC provides that only claims relating to enforcement of "occupational
safety and health or other technical labor standards" are subject to ECE review, NAALC,
art. 23(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1508, and defines "technical labor standards" to exclude the three
core organizing rights. NAALC, art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1514 ("technical labor standards"
refers only to labor principles (d)-(k)).
82. NAALC, arts. 27-41, 32 I.L.M. at 1509-13.
83. NAALC, art. 38, 32 I.L.M. at 1511.
84. NAALC, arts. 39-41, 32 I.L.M. at 1511-13.
85. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 74, at 185-86 ("The [NAALC] was insisted upon by
the United States because of the perceived inadequacy of Mexican labor law and its
enforcement.").
86. See e.g., TRADING AWAY RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that in the 1992
presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized NAFTA for failure to ensure
Mexico would enforce its labor standards and "sought to assuage concern within a key
Democratic Party constituency-labor unions-that United States-based companies would
move to Mexico to take advantage of lax enforcement of labor laws there.")"".
87. See Sarah Lowe, Comment, The First American Case Under the North American
Agreement for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 481, 488-490 (1997) (discussing
the emphasis on Mexican under-enforcement in the development of NAALC).
88. http:l/vww.dol.gov/do]Iilab/public/programs/nao.status.htm (last visited March

546

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4:3

Yet labor advocates in the United States could be making better use of
the NAALC process than the filing of seven different petitions in more
than eight years would indicate." First, a NAALC petition is a relatively
low-cost means to further certain domestic labor initiatives, by highlighting
an alleged abuse and creating an opportunity for media advocacy and
public education about the enforcement deficiency.90 Second, a NAALC
petition compels United States government authorities to muster a public
defense of their practices, which can itself be useful in a campaign. 9'
Third, in developing an official response, the government must measure its
performance against the international standards of the NAALC, which in
itself contributes to norm internalization in this country.92 Fourth, to the
extent NAALC petitions fail to deliver meaningful relief to the petitioners,
they will nevertheless help labor advocates document results under the
NAALC and strengthen arguments for enforceable labor conditions in
future bilateral or multilateral trade and investment agreements.93 Fifth,
there is evidence that in some instances NAALC petitions have
accomplished "concrete results" for workers.94 Finally, in taking seriously
the limited rights established by the NAALC and invoking its procedures,
labor advocates here set an example for their counterparts in other nations
and, by their deeds, help to refute criticism of international labor
agreements as naked protectionism or improper interventions in the
sovereign affairs of other states.
2002) (summarizing the content of twenty-three petitions); http://www.naalc.org/english/
publications/summarymexico.htm#2001 (announcing the filing of a twenty-fourth petition,
Mexico NAO 01-01). Technically there have been twenty-five filings, but in one instance
the identical petition was filed with the NAOs of both Canada and Mexico, TRADING AWAY
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 31, so I will refer to twenty-four petitions. For assessments of the
earliest NAALC submissions, see Compa, supra note 2, at 165-76; Compa, supra note 3, at
12-19.
89. Cf. Compa, supra note 3, at 19 ("Experience within the structures created by the
NAALC reflects unrealized potential. Only six cases were filed under the NAALC in its
first three years of operation.").
90. Id. (discussing the "sunlight" effect of NAALC scrutiny of domestic labor law
matters).
91. See Lance Compa, NAFTA's labour side agreement and international labour
solidarity, in PLACE, SPACE AND THE NEW LABOUR INTERNATIONALISMS (Peter Waterman

and Jane Wills eds., 2001). A similar function is performed by ILO petitions. Compa,
supra note 2, at 160 (ILO and OECD petition process establishes "an international forum for
labor rights advocacy that entails an obligation to answer complaints and explain labor
relations actions and policies... [which] creates an accountability that might otherwise be
lacking").
92. See Cleveland, supra note 2.
93. See Compa, supra note 2, at 163 (stating that "[tihe surer present course for making
sound judgments about the labor side agreement is to let experience under it take shape.").
94. Compa, supra note 3, at 19-20 (detailing examples of NAALC petitions positively
influencing corporate and governmental behavior and helping to sustain organizing
campaigns); infra notes 95-132 & accompanying text.
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In this section I explore how two of the least-examined of the seven
petitions claiming United States violations of the NAALC reveal the
limited but real potential for deploying the NAALC in campaigns for
working people in the United States. Both petitions are still pending, and
neither has secured a direct remedy for the petitioners, in the traditional
judicial sense of obtaining damages or securing injunctive relief.
Nevertheless, both arise in the heartland of NAALC protections-both
allege systemic government under-enforcement of domestic law regarding
one of the NAALC labor principles that can proceed all the way to
arbitration-and each has contributed at least modestly to broader labor
campaigns now underway.
1.

INS-DOL agreement, NAO Mexico 9804

In 1992, the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") and the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") executed a
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") that committed each agency to a
program of information-sharing in enforcement operations. 95 Pursuant to
this agreement, DOL pledged that when its staff reviewed employer payroll
records in minimum wage and overtime investigations, the staff would also
review the employer's immigration records and "expeditiously
communicate" any suspected irregularities to INS, in a manner that would
"clearly and specifically identify possible violations. 96
The most immediate consequence of the 1992 MOU was to chill
countless individual complaints to the DOL, lest the filing of a DOL
complaint trigger an INS worksite raid. 97 This chilling effect occurred even
though advocates and workers understood that courts9" and the DOL itself 9
95. Memorandum of Understanding Between INS and Labor Department on Shared
Enforcement Responsibilities, reprintedin Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at D-1 (June
11, 1992) [hereinafter MOU].
96. Id. at D-5. See also id. at D-3 (stating that the DOL is responsible for "prompt
referral to INS of all suspected... violations of the [immigration] provisions against
knowingly hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized workers").
97. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ruddick, Silencing Undocumented Workers: U.S. Agency
Policies Undermine Labor Rights and Standards, 23 NLG IMMIGRATION NEWSLETrER 3
(June 1996) (reporting on interviews with labor and immigration advocates, and concluding
that the MOU deterred immigrant workers from filing complaints with DOL); Gordon,
supra note 53, at 422 (stating the same). See also Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and
Evploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective
Legislation, 103 YALE L. J. 2179, 2182 (1994) (describing that immigrant workers' fear of
deportation deters reporting of sweatshop conditions).
98. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Fair Labor Standards Act ('FLSA") applies to all covered workers regardless of
immigration status); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding the same);
Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(holding the same).
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agreed that the wage and hour laws apply to all covered workers regardless
of immigration status.
The 1992 MOU thus served to depress the terms and conditions of
employment for millions of people, both immigrants receiving illegally low
wages and other workers competing with them. Because few low-wage
workers could afford private attorneys, most are not represented by unions,
and almost no legal services office handles low-wage worker cases,100
barring immigrants from seeking the DOL's assistance was tantamount to
denying them a remedy for the federal labor law violations. Moreover, the
effect of the MOU was intensified in states without a state minimum wage
law or where the state law sets a minimum wage below the federal
standard.'0 '
The 1992 MOU also undermined DOL enforcement generally. The
agency is heavily dependent on individual reporting in carrying out its
statutory enforcement duties:
For weighty practical and other reasons, [in enacting the FLSA]
Congress did not seek to secure compliance with prescribed
standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or
inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and
complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights
claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement
could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach
officials with their grievances." °2
In the years after the 1992 MOU was adopted, reform efforts by labor,
imfigrant, and civil rights advocates were sporadic and largely
uncoordinated. Most groups simply had too many other, more urgent
issues to press with decision-makers. Even sympathetic members of the
Clinton Administration tended to focus on other labor and immigration
matters, especially after Congress passed three major anti-immigrant
statutes in five months in 1996.103 Outside government, there was
99. See, e.g., Donovan v. Burgett Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1485 (10th Cir.
1985) (involving a DOL action enforcing FLSA on behalf of undocumented workers).
100. Gordon, supra note 53, at 422.
101. Currently, seven states have no minimum hourly wage and four states set the
minimum wage below the federal hourly amount. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Minimum Wage
Laws in the States, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/minwage/america.htm
(last modified Nov. 2001).
102. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (describing the
FLSA).
103. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§
401-443, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-81 (1996) (amending immigration statutes regarding the
deportation of non-citizens with criminal convictions); Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 400-435, 110 Stat. 2105,
2260-76 (restricting immigrant access to welfare benefits); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (enacting
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widespread sentiment that internal INS opposition to amending the MOU
had combined with general bureaucratic inertia to frustrate reform.
In late 1997, a group of Yale Law students formed a Workers' Rights
Project and decided to try to use the NAALC to attack the MOU.' °4 Their
objectives included rallying advocates around the issue, pressuring the
Clinton Administration to reform the policy, and testing the limits of the
NAALC process. The students knew that at the time only one NAALC
petition had been filed challenging labor abuses in the United States, °5 and
that no petition had yet targeted an official United States policy or alleged a
violation of one of the three NAALC principles that could proceed to
arbitration.106
draconian changes to immigration laws).
104. Graham Boyd was advisor to the Workers' Rights Project and counsel on the
NAALC petition. The principal students coordinating work on the petition were Shayne
Stevenson, Adriaan Lanni, and Daphne Keller.
105. See Mexico NAO Report on Public Submission 95-01, § 1-7 (1995), available at
http:f/www.dol.gov/dollilab/public/medialreports/nao/9501.htm (challenging the closing of
a Sprint Co. subsidiary shortly before union representation election and alleging systemic
under-enforcement of right to organize). The National Administrative Office ("NAO") of
Mexico recommended ministerial consultations, which resulted in an agreement by the
United States Department of Labor to hold a public forum and to commission a study of the
effect of rapid plant closings. See id. Ministerial Consultations-Submission 95-01 (Sprint
Case) Agreements on Implementation (1996), availableat www.dol.gov/ doll ilab/ public/
medialreports/nao/minagreemt9501.htm. Under the NAALC, no further proceedings are
authorized on a petition regarding the right to organize. For an early analysis of this
petition, see Lowe, supra note 87. As for the campaign, the National Labor Relations Board
concluded that the Sprint plant closure was motivated by anti-union animus and ordered
relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the Board's order was not
supported by substantial evidence and set it aside. LCF, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1276, 1283
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
106. Since the Sprint case, five petitions in addition to the MOU complaint have been
filed against the United States. See Mexico NAO Submission 98-01, available at
http:llwww.dol.gov/dollilab/public/medialreports/nao/mxnao9801.htm (alleging the underenforcement of various NAALC principles arising out of an organizing campaign at Solec,
Inc., a manufacturer of solar panels); Mexico NAO Submission 98-02, available at
http:llwww.dol.gov/dollilab/public/medialreports/nao/mxnao9802.htm (involving a broad
challenge to the under-enforcement of labor standards as to migrant apple workers in
Washington
State);
Mexico
NAO
Submission
98-03,
available
at
http:/lwww.dol.gov/dollilab/public/medialreports/nao/mxnao9803.htm
(alleging the
"ineffective enforcement of labor law at the DeCoster Egg Farm in Turner, Maine"); Canada
NAO Public Submission 99-01, available at http:llwww.dol.gov/ doll ilab/
publicfmedialreports/nao/submission990I.htm (challenging application, interpretation, and
enforcement of NLRA provisions relating to labor-management cooperative committees in
non-union workplaces); Mexico NAO Submission 01-01, available at http://www.naalc.
org/english/publications/summarymexico.htm#2001 (challenging extraordinary delays in the
New York State Workers Compensation Board adjudication of claims) (summarized at The
last of these was recently filed. The second to last was not accepted for review by NAO
Canada on the grounds that the petitioners had not established United States underenforcement. The U.S. and Mexico executed a Ministerial Agreement on the other three
petitions, in which the U.S. DOL agreed to hold government-to-government talks on
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The Yale students developed theories that the MOU led to systemic
under-enforcement of United States wage and hour laws in violation of the
NAALC, gathered statements from immigrant and labor advocates
regarding the MOU's chilling effect, and drafted the petition. It was
simultaneously filed with the NAOs in Canada and Mexico shortly after
Labor Day in 1998, on behalf of twenty groups representing a broad
coalition of unions, immigrant rights organizations, and community-based
labor groups. 10 7 The filing received modest press coverage. 108 In October

1998, a community-based organization in California released a national
report condemning the 1992 MOU and endorsing the NAALC petition,'9
prompting some further press coverage."o
Meanwhile, a significant development far from the grassroots NAALC
effort had increased prospects for revising the MOU. In the summer of
1998, Maria Echaveste, a former Wage and Hour Administrator at DOL
with an extensive background in immigrant labor issues and a commitment
to reforming the 1992 MOU, was promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President."'
In this position, Echaveste exercised the authority
to
112
overcome the bureaucratic inertia impeding reform of the MOU.
In November 1998, the Mexico NAO accepted the petition
challenging the MOU. Shortly thereafter, the INS and the DOL announced
that the agencies had entered into a new cooperation agreement,
superseding the 1992 MOU. In the new MOU, the agencies reversed
course and declared that in "complaint-driven" investigations the DOL
enforcement of the applicable NAALC principles and to sponsor public forums on migrant
agricultural issues. Agreement on Ministerial Consultations Mexican NAO Submissions
98-01, 98-02, & 98-03 (2000), available at http://www.dol.gov/ dol/ ilab!
public/media/reports/nao/minagreemt9801-9802-9803.htm
[hereinafter Agreement on
Ministerial Consultations]. See also Paul Lall, Note, ImmigrantFarmworkers and the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 31 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 597 (2000)
(analyzing a Washington State apple worker petition and arguing U.S. treatment of migrant
farrnworkers violates the NAALC); Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332,
341-42 n.15 (1st Cir. 2000) (dismissing labor claims by the nation of Mexico on behalf of
Mexican workers at DeCoster for lack of standing and stating that the remedy for Mexico's
concerns best secured through NAALC proceedings).
107. Mexico NAO No. 9804 (1998); Canada NAO No. 9802 (1998).
108. See Kevin McCoy, Suit Blasts Feds on sweatshops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18,
1998, at 5 (describing the petition as an "unusual lawsuit" filed to challenge "federal
government policy that protects sweatshop operators").
109. Portraitof Injustice: The Impact of Immigration Raids on Families, Workers, and
Communities (1998).
110. See, e.g., Immigrant Rights Group Voices Concern About Link Between INS Raids,
Sweatshops, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 199, at A-7 (Oct. 15, 1998) (describing NAALC
petition).
111. Bob Dart, From Migrant Worker She Rose to Key White House Role, Cox NEWS
SERVICE, May 27, 1999.
112. Interview with Muzaffar Chishti, former Director, UNITE Immigration Project
(Mar. 2002).
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would not inspect employer immigration records or report suspected
violations to the INS."13 The DOL press release stated that a key purpose of
the revision was "to allay fears in the immigrant community that prevent
complaints about labor abuses by unscrupulous employers from being
filed."'1 4 The DOL's own announcement of the new MOU noted that the
Mexico NAO had recently accepted the Yale petition.'1 5
Did the NAALC petition play any role in finally persuading INS and
DOL to revise the MOU? Although the MOU's amendment has been
attributed to the filing of the NAALC petition, ' 6 this overstates the case.
Despite the DOL's evident sensitivity to developments in the NAALC
proceeding, ' 7 in terms of a direct causal relationship, the NAALC petition
probably had little effect on the discussions within the Administration. '
But the development and filing of the NAALC petition has
accomplished several objectives. By offering a new (if limited) strategy,
the NAALC petition crystallized concerns about the MOU and elevated the
issue's profile among advocates at the grassroots and national levels. It
may have highlighted the MOU issue within the Labor Department." 9 It
also signaled that eventually the DOL and the INS would have to explain
their information-sharing arrangement in an international forum.
Moreover, the NAALC petition may yet afford advocates some opportunity
to participate in shaping the implementation of the 1998 MOU, and may
even play some role in the current wide-ranging bilateral discussions of the
treatment of Mexican nationals in the United States. 20
113. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Departmentof Justice, and the Employment StandardsAdministration, Department
of Labor,Nov. 23, 1998, reprintedin Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 227, at E-10, 11 (Nov. 25,
1998). See Deborah Billings, Complaint-Driven Workplace Inspections No Longer Will
hclude ImmigrationChecks, DAILY LAB. RnP. (BNA) No. 227, at AA-1 (Nov. 25, 1998).
114. ESA Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Department and INS Sign
Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Labor Standards Enforcement to Aid U.S.
Workers (Nov. 23, 1998), available at http:llwww.dol.gov/opa/ media/ press/ esa/
esa98474.htm).
115. Id. (stating that objections to 1992 MOU "were raised in a complaint filed by some
twenty U.S. groups... under the [NAALC] ...Mexico recently accepted the complaint for
'formal NAO review under the NAALC,' a Labor Department spokesman said.").
116. See, e.g., Arthurs. supra note 7, at 287 n.51.
117. See supra note 114.
118. Echaveste believes the NAALC petition had no influence at all on the 1998 MOU
revision. Interview with Maria Echaveste, former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
(Mar. 2002). Doris Meissner, Commisioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
at the time the MOU was revised, does not recall being aware in 1998 that a petition had
even been filed. Interview with Doris Meissner, former INS Commissioner (Feb. 2002).
119. See supra note 114.
120. This is because the 1998 revisions alone did not render moot the NAALC
submission. Following the revisions, the Mexico NAO propounded a series of questions to
the NAALC petitioners and to the United States NAO. After reviewing the responses in
October 2000 the Mexico NAO concluded that a live controversy remained and
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New York Workers' Compensation Board Delays, NAO Mexico
0101

As in other states, New York law provides that workers who are
injured or become ill in the course of employment may receive
compensation for medical expenses and lost income by filing a claim with
the Workers' Compensation Board ("WCB"). The injured worker's claim
is adjudicated by an administrative law judge and subject to administrative
and judicial review. 121 When the New York legislature created the
workers' compensation system, it extinguished common-law tort actions
for injured workers. Instead, by requiring employers to arrange for no-fault
insurance coverage, the new WCB was "designed to provide a swift and
sure source of benefits
to the injured employee or to the dependents of the
22
employee.'
deceased
In New York, the system has failed. Extraordinary delays in the
WCB's adjudication of claims by sick and injured employees mock the
statute's promise and leave many injured and destitute workers with the
choice between accepting a nominal settlement or facing years of
adjournments and appeals. As the New York State Bar Association
recently concluded, WCB delays are widespread and "are being used by
insurance carriers and employers to obtain unfair advantage over
claimants.' 2 3
In the late 1990s, a small group of community labor organizations in
New York City began to work to improve health and safety conditions in
low-wage workplaces and better to assure that injured workers receive fair
and prompt compensation.' 24 When meetings with WCB officials,
including the state chairman, failed to yield improvements in the timely
processing of claims, these groups launched "It's About TIME!: Campaign
for Workers' Health and Safety,"
a campaign of vigorous public
demonstrations, worker organizing, media advocacy, coalition-building,
and legislative reform. l 5
recommended ministerial consultations, a request that the U.S. NAO formally accepted in
January 2002. See http:llwww.dol.gov/dollilab/public/programs/nao/status.htm#iib5.
121. See N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §§ 1 et seq (McKinney 1984).
122. O'Rourke v. Long, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (NY 1976).
123. New York State Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on
Administrative Adjudication, at 92 (Oct. 1999). See also id. ("It is clear that the review
delays [in WCB proceedings] described in the 1988 Task Force Report are still
occurring... The threat of a long contested claim proceeding followed by a long review
process is potent enough to force many claimants to settle for less than they might otherwise
be entitled to receive.").
124. These organizations included Chinese Staff & Workers Association, National
Mobilization Against Sweat Shops ("NMASS"), and Workers' Awaaz.
125. See Mexico NAO Submission 01-01, ex. A, Affidavit of Chinese Staff & Workers
Association, at 16 (copy on file with author).
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As one aspect of their efforts to publicize the extraordinary delays at
the New York WCB and to hold the Board's leadership accountable for
those delays, a delegation of injured workers from "It's About TIME!"
traveled to Mexico City in October 2001 to file a NAALC petition with the
Mexico NAO. 126 The petition, NAO Mexico Submission 01-01, alleges
that the New York WCB violates the NAALC procedural guarantee that
labor proceedings not "entail... unwarranted delays."' 27 The delays, the
petition maintains, contravene two of the NAALC's eleven labor
principles, those relating to compensation for and prevention of
occupational injury and illness.' 2 Significantly, a violation of the latter
principle is one of the few that can proceed to full arbitration under the
terms of the NAALC. The Mexico NAO promptly accepted jurisdiction
over the petition.' 29
The "It's About TIME!" petitioners have been successful in using the
petition in their media and political advocacy. There has been a significant
amount of press coverage of the case.130 In addition, the NAALC petition
helped the campaign to press for federal intervention to redress the state
workers' compensation board delays when the campaign was invited to
"'
testify at a Senate subcommittee hearing on workplace safety and health.13
Most importantly, filing the petition invigorated the organizing campaign
and energized its on-going education and outreach efforts on the abuses of
the New York workers' compensation system.132 As the Mexico NAO
begins its investigation of the petition, there may be further opportunities
for the members of It's About Time to engage in public education and
legislative and media advocacy, and the WCB leadership may yet be
compelled to justify the mammoth delays in its system.

126. Graham Gori, World Briefing: The Americas: Mexico: Suit Against New York, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at A10.
127. NAALC, art. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 1504, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/
publications/summarymexico.htm#2001 (summarizing the submission).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 124. See also Thomas Adcock, Workers File NAFTA Petition in
Mexico; State Workers' Compensation Board Targeted, N.Y. L. J.,Nov. 9, 2001, at 16;
Daniel Hays, Mexico to Probe N.Y. Workers' Comp Board,NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROPERTY
AND CASUALTY-RSK & BENEFITS MGMT, Dec. 17, 2001, at 20; Thomas Maier, Mexico To
Probe Immigrant Claims; Workers say NY denied pleasfor compensation, NEwSDAY, Dec.
4, 2001, at A12.
131. Interview with Sameer Ashar, NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic, lead counsel for
petitioners in Mexico NAO 01-01 (Feb. 2002).
132. Id. See also http:llwww.nmass.orglnmass/wcomp/nafta-whatis.html (NMASS had
"decided to file the NAFTA petition to publicize how workers' human rights are being
violated here in New York State... we want to put pressure on Governor Pataki and the
New York State Legislature. We want them to see the importance of protecting the health
and safety of all workers").
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Using the NAALC to Enforce InternationalLabor Norms

The NAALC challenges to the INS-DOL MOU and to delays at the
New York Workers' Compensation Board offer several useful lessons for
labor advocates in the United States. First, the core labor-rights criticisms
of the NAALC are correct. The labor side agreement creates almost no
binding obligations on the signatory nations, apart from the commitment to
enforce their existing labor laws and to guarantee certain minimal due
process-type rights in administrative proceedings."' The NAALC does not
directly bind private employers. The agreement's enforcement procedures
are cumbersome and foreclose meaningful relief except as to violations of
the three principles that could theoretically lead to arbitration and
sanctions. 14 In short, the NAALC does not limit abusive practices by
employers, does not require the signatory countries to upgrade their
domestic labor standards, and threatens lax government enforcement with
only symbolic penalties.
On the other hand, a NAALC petition can help achieve limited goals.
The NAALC petitions that appear to be attacks on private employers
dressed up as condemnations of government action fit less well with the
NAALC scheme than campaigns truly aimed at government practices.
Where the purpose of a labor initiative is in fact to reform an official policy
such as the INS-DOL MOU, or an informal but systemic practice, such as
delays at the New York WCB, a petition can serve to focus advocacy
efforts, provoke media attention to an enforcement deficiency, and compel
a government response.135 In these ways a NAALC petition can contribute
directly to a political campaign.
A NAALC petition can potentially serve organizing and public
education goals as well. It can be a platform for individual workers to
communicate their experiences to others, through written declarations
included with a petition or oral statements at related press, community, and
political events. 13 That a NAALC petition is not controlled by formal rules
133. Compa, supra note 3, at7.
134. After detailing the fate of another NAALC petition, Clyde Summers assessed the
NAALC thus: "The mouse brought forth by the mountain's labors was an agreement by the
secretaries of labor to hold three seminars, study Mexican labor law, and schedule
meetings." Summers, supra note 74, at 178 (analyzing U.S. NAO No. 94-03, arising from
Sony Corp.'s labor abuses at a maquiladora plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico and the
Mexican government's failure to enforce various labor laws at the factory). For a more
positive account of the NAALC's potential, see Compa, supra note 91.
135. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 1546 ("[I]t is clear that the NAALC's primary
contribution to the transnational labor rights regime to date has been to create a forum for
regional public awareness of labor rights issues."); Summers, supra note 74, at 187 ("The
submission process raises to public view and places in sharp focus the too easily ignored
failures to live up to [the NAALC] standards."); Compa, supra note 91.
136. Interview with Sameer Ashar, supra note 131.
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of evidence, procedure, or judicial precedent can enable broad worker
participation in preparing, drafting, and "litigating" a petition. Not
insignificantly, filing and prosecuting a NAALC petition is a relatively
low-cost form of advocacy that need not involve substantial expenditures
of time or money.
Finally, filing a NAALC petition can improve awareness of
international labor instruments and their shortcomings among workers,
advocates, press, and government officials. This, in turn, will both promote
the internalization of international labor norms in this country and set an
example for labor advocates in other countries of respect for those
international obligations accepted by our nation, while at the same
137time it
will highlight gaps in current domestic and international labor law.
A few examples of possible uses of the NAALC process to contribute
to labor campaigns directed at United States government policies such as
the INS-DOL MOU or New York workers' compensation delays may
further illustrate these points. First, where a government agency expressly
fails to carry out a statutory duty, a NAALC petition might be of use in a
movement to force official action. For example, in 1998 Congress
established "whistleblower" protections for H-1B visa holders1 a who
139di
complain of labor abuses, specifically directing the INS and the DOL to
safeguard the immigration status of H-1B workers who file labor
complaints."'4 The agencies have yet to issue regulations implementing the
statutory command, however, or to otherwise establish a program to assure
the immigration status of H-lB whistleblowers. 141 Another example of a
NAALC petition potentially contributing to a political campaign to compel
government officials to carry out a law are the efforts by labor advocates in
St. Louis and Buffalo to overcome mayoral refusals to implement
municipal "living wage" ordinances. 42 Labor and community advocates

137. See, e.g., Lall, supra note 106 (analyzing weaknesses in domestic labor law
coverage of migrant farmworkers and urging recourse to NAALC); Summers, supra note
74, at 186 (NAALC petitions challenging United States practices cannot improve labor
standards but "can "serve the purpose of deflating our hubris and focusing our attention on
our pervasive failure to effectively enforce our own labor laws").
138. The H-1B visa program offers temporary employment visas to specialized workers.
See 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2001).
139. American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Title IV, §
413(a), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998), (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)
(2)(C)(iv) (2001)) (providing that an employer may not "intimidate, threaten, restrain,
coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in any other manner discriminate against [such] employee"
because H-lB visa-holder discloses violation of H-lB rules or cooperates with
investigation).
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(v) (2001).
141. See 64 Fed. Reg. 649 (Jan. 5, 1999) ("[DOL] and INS are working in close
cooperation to develop this authorization procedure.").
142. See Missouri ex rel. St. Louis Living Wage Campaign v. Harmon, Cause No. 004-
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leading the political and legal campaigns to compel municipal compliance
with "living wage" ordinances
could also challenge the local defiance as
143
NAALC.
the
of
violative
Second, filing a NAALC petition may be useful in campaigns directed
at violations of the NAALC's procedural obligations. 144 For example,
extraordinary delay in the adjudication of labor complaints is subject to
attack as violative of the NAALC guarantee that government proceedings
"do not entail... unwarranted delays."' 45 Certainly, agencies notorious for
delay, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") and state worker compensation boards would seem liable to
challenge under the NAALC.
Third, filing a NAALC petition may be helpful in efforts to challenge
contradictory policies in which one agency, like the INS or the Social
Security Administration ("SSA"), pursues an enforcement strategy that
directly undermines labor law enforcement. One example is the INS-DOL
MOU challenged in NAO Mexico No. 98-04, but there are others. For
instance, there is evidence that the INS is regularly, and likely willingly,
used by unscrupulous employers to retaliate against their immigrant
workers,' 46 despite internal INS rules limiting the agency's involvement in
labor disputes.' 47 INS violations of its own rules regarding involvement in
labor disputes undoubtedly deters immigrant workers from reporting illegal
02640 (St. Louis City Circ. Ct.) (filed December 2000) (alleging municipal failure to
implement an ordinance); Coalition for Econ. Justice v. City of Buffalo, 1-2001-6163 (Sup.
Ct. Erie Co.) (filed July 11, 2001) (same).
143. The NAALC is unquestionably binding on state and local authorities as well as the
federal governments that are the formal signatories to the instrument. The Mexico NAO has
twice accepted jurisdiction over petitions challenging a state or local government's noncompliance with the NAALC. See NAO Mexico No. 98-02 (alleging that Washington State
failed to safeguard the rights of apple workers, inter alia, to organize, to the minimum wage,
and to be protected from occupational safety and health hazards, as guaranteed by state
law); Agreement on Ministerial Consultations, supra note 106, at 2 (providing that the U.S.
and Mexico agreed to an action plan that includes further exchanges regarding "the role of
federal and state agencies in the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers
in
the
United
States")
(emphasis
added);
http://www.naalc.org/english/
publications/summarymexico.htm#2001 (prividing that the Mexico NAO accepts
jurisdiction over Submission 01-01, alleging delay in state workers' compensation system).
144. See NAALC, "Procedural Guarantees," art. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 1503, 1504.
145. NAALC, art. 5(1) (d), 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
146. See, e.g., Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding a deportation
order against labor activist whose employer requested INS raid in retaliation for organizing
activities); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (describing efforts by employer to retaliate against worker who filed overtime
complaint by contacting the INS and Social Security Administration).
147. See INS Operating Instruction 287.3a (establishing additional procedural
requirements prior to a INS worksite raid where INS suspects it may be involved in labor
dispute), reprinted in 74 Interpreter Releases 199 (Jan. 20, 1997), redesignated as §
33.14(h), INS Special Agent Field Manual (Apr. 28, 2000).
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activity to labor and employment agencies and, therefore, like the former
INS-DOL MOU, leads to the systemic under-enforcement of labor
standards.1 4 1 Similarly, recent revisions to the "no-match" enforcement
program of the SSA, a longstanding SSA initiative to link employer payroll
withholdings to individual worker accounts when the employer's filings do
not "match" the SSA's own computer records, have prompted employers to
threaten or discharge workers, despite SSA advisories against adverse
employment actions. 49
ImI. CONCLUSION

The challenges globalization poses for workers and their advocates are
many, as are the demands on the limited resources of working people and
their organizations. There is a manifest need to support cross-border
organizing initiatives and to insist that bilateral and multilateral trade and
investment agreements contain meaningful and enforceable labor
protections. On the other hand, it may, at times, be difficult to defend
expending organizing time and worker monies on international efforts that
appear to offer, at best, indirect benefits in the distant future.
Strategies to use international labor law in the service of United States
domestic labor campaigns can help to resolve the tension between the need
for unions and other labor advocates to participate in international
responses to globalization and the competing need to devote scarce
resources to issues of immediate concern to workers in this country.
Enforcement of international labor laws in the United States can play a
useful role in deepening the engagement of the U.S. labor movement in
international issues, in a manner that is also justifiable in terms of the more
direct, short-term interests of workers in this country. Ironically, the
widespread mistreatment of immigrant workers in the United States
provides a number of opportunities to achieve these objectives. Such
strategies are, of course, not a full response to the pressures globalization
places on working people, but in combination with other efforts, these
underutilized approaches can eventually be of substantial benefit to
workers in this country and abroad.

148. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issuesfor Undocumented Workers, in CROSSBORDER HUMAN RESOURCES, LABOR AND EmPLOYMENT IssuEs, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 54TH
ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed., forthcoming 2002) (stating that an
INS violation of internal rules restricting agency involvement in labor disputes undermines
labor rights); Ruddick, supra note 97, at 10-12 (stating the same).
149. National Immigration Law Center, Basic Information about SSA 'No-Match'
Letters, at 2 (Feb. 2000) (relating instances where employers fired workers on SSA "nomatch" list or used letters to thwart labor organizing campaign).

